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The volume of case law upon the problem of torts arising
out of the administration and operation of property held in trust
is not large. One does not find it possible to answer upon au-
thority many of the questions which suggest themselves in an
attempt to outline the various situations which might arise.
Literature of the subject as found in the periodicals and treat-
ises, as might be expected, is also meager. However, what has
been written has been so well done and by such able scholars
that it is perhaps a work of supererogation to write upon it
again. The articles by Professor Scott' and by Mr. Justice
Stone,2 although published some years ago, do not leave much
* Professor of Law, University of South Dakota. The writer desires to
acknowledge the help of one of his students, Mr. Edson Hubbard in running
down authorities.
1 Scott, "Liabilities in the Administration of Trusts," 28 Harv. L. Rev.
725 (1915).
2 Stone, "A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and
Torts of the Trustee," 2z Col. L. Rev. 527 (1922). Mr. Justice Stone's
theory briefly stated is that the trustee has the power to appropriate trust prop-
erty to the payment of trust expenses regardless of the state of his accounts
and that in every case where the third party's judgment whether in Tort or
Contract proves uncollectible against the trustee personally the claimant should
be able to recover from the trust estate in equity regardless of whether trustee
is in arrears. This should be so because it results in imposing on the trust
estate those economic burdens which are incidental to its proper administration.
He does not contend, however, that the action should be brought against the
trustee in a representative capacity, but adheres to the view that this right of
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to be said beyond bringing the subject up to date by the presen-
tation of a few cases subsequently reported and presenting the
writer's own view. It may also be possible to suggest a recog-
nizable trend in the recent cases. Mr. Bogert's unsurpassed
treatise published in 1935' of course discusses the general state
of the law on this topic and cites exhaustively the cases.'
The rules on this subject as they have long been accepted
by the majority of states are concisely stated in the leading
texts. As Mr. Bogert puts it': "The problem arises whether the
party suffering damage from the tort should sue the trustee
as trustee or should bring an action against him simply as a
private individual, without reference to his representative ca-
pacity. Shall he seek satisfaction of his judgment out of the
trust property or out of the property of the trustee? In har-
mony with the rules . . . with respect to contract liability the
the claimant is a derivative one, equitable in its nature and that for reasons of
practicable convenience the creditor may be required to exhaust his legal
remedies before resorting to equity. Mr. Justice Stone does not indicate that
he favors imposing upon the trust estate the consequences of a tort committed
by the trustee as his own negligence, and, if the trustee is insolvent, would as
to that class of torts let the loss rest where it fell rather than shift it to he
cestui que trust. This of course is the logical sequel of the theory that the
third party's right is personal against the trustee but only derivative against
the estate.
3 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935), Chapter 34-
4 Other sources for general discussions of the entire problem and collection
of authorities include: i Perry, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 437a; 7 A.L.R.
408; x4 A.L.R. 371; 44 A.L.R. 637; Loring, Trustee's, pp. 33, 188; various
notes in periodicals of which see especially, 43 Harv. L. Rev. I1 z, i Cor-
nell L.Q. No. 134; Other noteworthy articles dealing with this problem in-
clude: Burdett, "Liability of the Trust Estate for Torts of the Trustee," 39
W. Va. L.Q. 251 (1933); Kerr, "Liability of Trust Estates for Torts of the
Trustee's Servants," 5 Tex. L. Rev. 368 (1 9Z7); and, Brandeis, "Liability of
Trust Estates on Contracts made for their Benefit," 15 A. L. Rev. 449 (88 I).
For particular reference to Ohio Law on this point the reader is referred
to Vanneman, "Liability of the Trust Estate for Obligations Created by the
Trustee in Ohio," 9 U. of Cin. L. Rev. (935); and, 40 Ohio Jur. 475,
the title "Trusts" by Mr. Vanneman. The present writer has discovered no
Ohio cases subsequent to those referred to by Mr. Vanneman in the sources
mentioned and has nothing to add to those sources which have any particular
reference to Ohio Law.
5 3 Bogert, "Trusts and Trustees," p. z158; secs. 264, 265, 266. Restate-
ment, Trusts.
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great weight of English and American authority imposes re-
sponsibility for such torts upon the trustee in his individual
capacity and not as a fiduciary. Any judgment recovered is
collectible out of the private property of the trustee and not out
of the trust assets." Similarly Perry on Trusts and Trstees6
"By the weight of authority a trust estate cannot be held liable
for torts committed by the trustee. Ordinarily he can be held
liable only in his individual capacity, and he is personally liable
to third persons for his torts either of misfeasance or of non-
feasance in failing to keep the trust property in repair, irrespec-
tive of his right of reimbursement."
At this point it is proposed for the sake of brevity hereinafter
to introduce a word of convenience. This word or word com-
bination is "TRUST-TORTS" and will be defined for the purposes
of this paper as follows: Wrongs committed in the course
of maintaining, operating, or administering property held in
a trust or fiduciary capacity by one person or persons, etc.,
according to the usual legal rigamarol for the use or benefit
of another or others and shall include both wrongs committed
by the act of the trustee himself or by agents and employees
working under his control or general direction in any capacity
in connection with the trust.
Reasons consonant with a jurisprudence of dry and formal
legal and equity concepts and quite self righteously and dis-
dainfully disregardful of the functional situation under which
most "TRUST-TORTS" happen, have been elaborated in the cases
from which the general statements as made in Bogert and Perry
are drawn. A reason appearing more prominently in the earlier
of such cases when these rules were taking form was that
trust funds must not be dissipated because of the wrongful acts
of trustees.! Here as at so many points in the law, rights of
I Perry, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 437a.
7 Parnzcnter v. Barstow, 2z R.I. 245, 47 At. 365 (1900); Wahl v.
Schmidt, 307 Ill. 331, 138 N.E. 604 (1923). The note in 44 A.L.R. says at
page 638, "The theory is that when a trustee, executor commits a tort he
steps out of the line of his duty, in other words, in so far as he commits a
wrong, he does not represent the estate and therefore it should not be held
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property get more than an even break in the age-long conflict
with the rights of personality. Gradually and rather quietly
this argument was dropped in the "Trust-Torts" cases as it was
in the cases involving the tort liability of charities and in the
more recent cases one sees but few references to it."
Other cases given as a reason for the prevailing rule that the
courts cannot recognize as "Trustee As Such" as a distinct
personality from the trustees as a person.' Of course he is often
not a person but a corporation something like a bank and indis-
tinguishable from a bank to anyone but a lawyer. This is to say,
the courts have been unwilling to ascribe legal personality to a
trust. In other words a trust is not a legal thing. It is but a
relation recognized in equity between other legal persons. In
spite of the easy wave of the hand with which courts have
brushed aside any difficulty in the way of calling a corporation
a person; in spite of the fact that they have for various pur-
poses treated other creations of the kind as funtioning entities,
they have in the main been unwilling to do this with trusts.
There is a plausible consistency about this attitude particularly
as between trusts and corporations in that in both situations
primary regard is paid to form rather than to function."0 A
liable." Note how commentators fall into the way of speaking of the trust
as though it were an entity. Desehler v. Fraffklir, I i Ohio C.D. 18 8 (19oo).
" Feezer, "The Tort Liability of Charities," 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. i i
(19z8). Prof. Vanneman also criticizes this reason as given for the immunity
of charities from tort liability. 9 U. Cin. L. Rev. I, 3-
' Cases might be multiplied in these footnotes but why use up time, type
or space. The cases will be found collected in the leading treatises, annotations
and in the articles by more industrious writers whose work I have referred to.
As to this point see particularly the best of the law review cases noted, 18 Cor.
L. Q. 134 (193z) and cases there cited.
10 To digress somewhat, a most interesting discussion of the way in which
the Supreme Court at Washington has been able to do what it wanted to do
by calling a corporation a person within the meaning of the 14th Amendment
is found in Prof. Thurman Arnold's new book The Folklore of Capitalism.
See Chapter VIII, "The Personification of Corporations" in which it is
explained how great organizations can be treated as individuals and the curious
ceremonies which attend this way of thinking. The above reference may not
be the most pertinent imaginable legal authority for the statement in the text
to which it is footnoted but the writer believes that every lawyer should read
Arnold's book and this seems the best place to say so.
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corporation may run a business or operate properties whose ac-
tivities produce torts. So may a trustee, but in either case we
must find a person upon whom the hand of law may be laid with
the judgment, "Thou shalt pay."1 Of course the legislature
did the same thing to trusts so far as concerns the rights and
necessary procedure of third parties having claims against it.
This has in effect been done in a few states in which there is a
statute declaring that a trustee is a general agent for the trust
property and providing that, "His acts, within the scope of his
authority, bind the trust property to the same extent as the
acts of an agent bind his principal." 2
As we have already seen in the great majority of jurisdic-
tions the tort claimant must bring his action against the trustee
as the person involved. The trustee must be named defendant
as a simple person because the law cannot recognize his func-
tional personality as an agent of what is from a practical point
of view an organization, an institution. Why? Because never
having been baptized with the water of life wherewith the leg-
islature blesses corporations, it is not a person. I have con-
tinued to speak of the trust as though it were something in spite
of the cases which say it is nothing and shall continue so to
speak of it. This is not to deny that it is a phantom but only
in the same sense that a corporation is a phantom. So is a part-
nership a phantom but it is often recognized by the law. So is
an unincorporated labor union with a half-million members a
phantom but it may be sued as an entity in the Supreme Court
11 Even when so complex a business enterprise as a street railway was
operated by a trustee, a personal injury resulting from the negligence of a
motorman has been held to impose only personal liability on the trustee,
O'Toole v. Faulkner, 29 Wash. 544, 70 Pac. 58 (1902). Moreover in this
case the trustee was purely a straw man, a bookkeeper in the street railway
offices who was not even given an extra dollar or two in his weekly pay
envelope for undertaking the responsibilities of owner of the legal tide of
the entire plant. This is the sort of case where the law's passion for riding a
concept to what ever end it may lead makes the profession look ridiculous
to the layman.
12 Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 2267 (1931), Mont. Rev. Code Supp. Sec. 7914
(927), N. D. Comp. Laws, sec. 6305 (913), S. D. Comp. Laws, sec. 122o
(1929).
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of the United States if the other circumstances essential to juris-
diction by that court are present.
It seems desirable to the writer to speak of the trust as
though it were an entity when we see it functioning as such.
The courts have shown us in various and diverse situations that
they are able to invoke the fiction of personality. It is a useful
rabbit in the hat and it has been made to work very useful legal
miracles by serving to explain in terms of familiar legal for-
mulas which find acceptance by the profession, results which
lawyers and layity alike intuitively regard as acceptable adjust-
ments of various concepts. The writer is here regreting that
there has not been the willingness to use it in other cases where
it would work equally well and thus avoid the resort to the
more round about legal hocus-pocus which is resorted to in
order that the victim of a "TRUST-TORT" may get his money
and at that out of the trust res. If he does get it, of course it
usually comes in the end from the trust estate. The unfortu-
nate feature of the present prevailing method is that all parties
concerned, claimant, trustee and cestais are put to delay and
increased expense. Then too there are cases where the claimant
is barred from relief although the trust estate may be able to
pay without hardship.'
'3 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 66 L. Ed.
975, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570 (I92I). As to the suability of unincorporated
associations generally and for a revealing picture of the judicial process at
work with the concept of legal personality in which the said "J.P." first
raises the fiction and then crys, "Off with his head," with all the consistency
of the red queen, see Sturges, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to
Actions," 33 Yale L. J. 383 (1923), Note 24. Va. L. Rev. 204 (1937).
'4 It was the writer's intention to include in this text a somewhat extended
discussion of various instances and situations where courts have considered and
sometimes used the device of fictitious personality. It seems on further con-
sideration somewhat of an insult to the learned reader's intelligence to do
this at the length originally contemplated, and the material collected has
accordingly been sifted and compressed into this footnote.
The most familiar and the most obvious example is THE CORPORATION
whose right to be recognized as an entity, of course arises out of legislation,
but the concept behind it is, of course, one created by lawyers, and many of
the uses of the fiction personality in dealing with corporation problems in
the law involves what some people like to damn with the phrase "judicial
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The ultimate subjection of the trust property to these tort
claims is accomplished in this way. If the trustee pay the judg-
ment out of that pocket in which he keeps his own money, he
may then reach into the other pocket where he keeps the trust
legislation." If that phrase means anything in particular, it, of course, means
nothing more than the job courts are always doing, and that is the task they
exist for, viz., to decide cases. When a court decides a case, it is the law for
the parties to the particular controversy, and that is true to the extent and in
the same manner whether it follows a very dose local precedent or decides a
point without local precedent on the basis of its judgment. This is so whether
it chooses one or the other of various rationalizations to be found in older
cases or works out a new one of its own. It is true, whether there is a statute
in the picture or not, because the court has still to determine whether the
statute applies or not and, if it does, what it means in its relation to the instant
controversy. Powell's Cases on Possessory Estates, p. 2, contains a quotation
from President Theodore Roosevelt's Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 19o8,
which voices this same thought: "The chief lawmakers of our country may be,
and often are, the judges because they are the final seat of authority. Every
time they interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of law,
liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy;
and as such interpretation is fundamental they give direction to all law
making."
As this is not a digest of cases, but a plea for realistic thinking about
trusts, it is futile to list cases dealing with all the ways in which corporations
are treated by the courts as persons.
PARTNERSHIP: Of course a partnership is not an entity, a person; it
is a mere aggregation of individuals. Or is it? That was fought out when the
Uniform Partnership Act was drafted and the commissioners rejected Dean
Ames' draft, which followed rather consistently the entity theory, and adopted
William Draper Lewis' draft, which was supposed to employ the aggregate
theory but which will not work in many situations without thinking about and
treating the "firm" as an entity apart from the individuals who own it. "You
cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless you grasp the
notion of the existence of the firm as a separate entity from the existence of
the partners; a notion which was well grasped by the old Roman lawyers and
which was partly understood in the courts of equity before it was part of the
whole law of the land as it is now." Jessell, M. R., in Pooley v. Driver,
5 Ch.D. 458, 476 (876).
As to whether a partnership is an entity since it is a business device,
created and used by business men, it might be well to consider how they look
at it, and especially how they use it. Is there any doubt that functionally it is
something apart from its members? Gilmore on Partnership, pp. 114 to 117.
There are many cases in which courts have said (for the purpose of explaining
a particular decision, of course) that a partnership is an entity. There are
plenty of others, where in one form of circumstances or another, courts have
said a partnership is not an entity, but "even though a court may not recog-
nize the partnership as an entity, it will recognize the usage of business men
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money and take for himself the same amount. This is called
the trustee's right of reimbursement. This is quite generally
conceded by the authorities subject to qualifications which will
be mentioned later. One of the leading cases standing for this
in interpreting their contracts." Gilmore, p. I 14. Likewise there has been
much writing in the periodicals for and against the idea of a partnership as
an entity. 28 Harv. L. Rev. 76z (915); 29 Harv. L. Rev. I58, 291
(1916); 29 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (z916); 24 Yale L.J. 617 (1915); 15 Mich.
L. Rev. 609 (1917); 36 Yale L.J. 254 (1926); 29 Col. L. Rev. 1134
(1929). Even trust law talks about partnerships as if considering them
entities when it says, for example, that if a partner takes title in his own name
he holds it in trust for the "firm." The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 sec. i (I9)
treats a partnership as an entity.
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS: For the purpose of administer-
ing assets and disposing of claims, etc., from a practical standpoint, the "estate"
functions as something apart. Hendee v. State, 8o Neb. 8o, 1 13 N.W. 1050
(1907): "The estate of a deceased person pending litigation is a legal entity
and in charging a violation of section 171 of the Criminal Code (embezzle-
ment) it is sufficient to allege as to ownership that the money or property
embezzled belongs to such an estate"; Billings v. State, 107 Ind. 54, 6 N.E.
914 (1886): "To our minds it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent
should be regarded as an artificial person."
This analogy of the decedent's estate is coming very close to the trust
situation, to which it is desired by the writer to assimilate these other situa-
tions so close that what is said throughout the text of this paper refers to
executors having duties to perform in connection with the property in their
hands to the same extent that it does to permanent trusts, either under the
will creating both offices, executor and trustee, or under a deed or indenture
creating a trust inter vivos.
UNBORN CHILDREN: Unborn children may or may not be persons
under the law for one purpose or another. A case which attracted considerable
attention a few years ago was Drakzrer v. Peters, 23z N.Y. z2o, 133 N.E.
567, 2o A.L.R. 1503 (1921) in which plaintiff's mother fell into a coal hole
negligently left open in the sidewalk by defendant and was so hurt that
plaintiff was prematurely born and suffered other injuries by which plaintiff
was handicapped for life. It was held that plaintiff had no cause of action
because he was not in existence as a person at the time of injury. The reason
given by the court was that the child is part of the mother and has no separate
existence. The court said: "The injuries when inflicted were injuries to the
mother." Cardozo dissented. This decision, which reversed the lower court,
thus conformed to the other cases up to that time in the opinion that an
unborn child is not a person when it comes to being the victim of a tort.
However, the unborn child has since been recognized in the law of torts in
Texas. In Magnolia Coca Cola Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 47 S.W. (2d)
901 (932), parents were allowed to recover for death (under the statute
which allowed recovery for wrongful death only where the deceased could
rule is Benett v. Wyndham"5 in which the trustee of an estate
directed the bailiff to have certain trees cut for lumber to be
used in making repairs. The baliff ordered the woodcutters
usually employed on the estate to cut certain trees. In doing
so they allowed a tree to fall so that a branch struck a passerby
in a public lane breaking his leg. He sued the trustee personally
and recovered very substantial damages which the trustee paid.
It was held that as between the trustee and the estate this ex-
pense should be borne by the estate as the trustee is entitled to
indemnity.
If the trustee has no money in his personal money pocket,
or, even if he has, he may take the money directly out of the
trust pocket and pay the creditor. This is called the trustee's
have recovered had he lived) of a child born prematurely because of a negli-
gent injury to the mother, thereby causing the child's death. This court
reasons from the situation where a posthumous child is allowed recovery for
the wrongful death of its father. Of this question, says 5 Minnesota Law
Review, at p. 240: "It is interesting to note what this non-existent person
(unborn child) can do. Justice Buller in Thelluson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227,
3Z2 (1799), (this is the famous case on the rule against accumulations and is,
in a sense, another trusts case) points out that this non-existent person may be
vouched in a recovery, may be an executor, may take under the Statute of
Distribution, may take a devise, may have a guardian and may have an injunc-
tion and Justice Buller approves the statement of Lord Hardwick in Wallis v.
Hodsoz, z Atk. I1 5 (1740) that a child en ventra sa mere was 'a person in
rerum natura so that by rules of the common and civil law she was to all
intents and purposes as much as if born in the father's lifetime.' The law
has carefully provided for the protection of property rights of an unborn
child * * * ." Likewise in criminal law for purposes of homicide an unborn
child may be a person; see Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. I, 23 So. 671 (1898)
and Clark & Marshall, Crimes (3rd Ed. 1927) sec. 23 4 (b). In this matter
sEe case notes, 22 Col. L. Rev. 379; 7 Cornell L.Q. 275; 70 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
335; 31 Yale L.J. 563; 26 Yale L.J. 315; 46 Harv. L. Rev. 344. The
interesting analogy to be drawn from this is that the courts can endow with
legal personality what they want to. In recognizing the property rights, but
not the personal rights of the unborn child, we again encounter that consistency
of law which seeks to protect the trust fund against dissipation. In short,
property rights are recognized in both cases, in the case of the unborn child
by ascribing personality as illustrated in the reference to Thelluson v. Wood-
ferd, and in the trust cases by refusing to recognize it. Also an unborn child
may be the cestui of a constructive trust raised upon false representations
made to the mother before such child was conceived. Piper v. Haard, 107
N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 6z6 (I887).
15 4 DeG.F.&J. 259, 45 Eng. Repr. 1183 (186z).
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right of exoneration. This, as well as reimbursement is allowed
because of the nature of the duty of a trustee to his cestui que
trust. This duty is one enforcible only.in equity through a bill
brought by the cesta. for an accounting. Upon an accounting
a trustee is obliged to turn over or show in his possession as the
circumstances may indicate only the net proceeds of his admin-
istration over and above legitimate expenses and other author-
ized disbursements. The concepts through which this matter is
handled do not come far from recognizing the trust as an entity
with the trustee as an agent and the cestgi as his principal. But
of course this is in equity. All our learning tells us that as be-
tween cestui and trustee we are in the field of equity but that
as to the rest of the world the trustee holds legal title to the
trust res and hence is not an agent at all.
But even this is not all. If the trustee has a right of exon-
eration and neglects or refuses to use it or for some other reason
the third party has been unable to get his claim satisfied, such
party, after proper preliminaries may have the aid of the courts
of equity.to get his pay directly out of the trust res. 6 Thus the
claimant is said to be "subrogated" to the trustee's right of in-
demnity or exoneration. In one of the leading English cases
where a judgment at law was recovered against a trustee per-
osnally but remained unsatisfied the third party applied in
"6 "When the judgment operates only to bind the trustee personally,
equity will protect the trust property from levy and execution and the creditor
must, therefore, resort to equity in order to appropriate the trust property to
his claim. There is not entire agreement as to whether he must first exhaust
his legal remedies; but the considerations of practical convenience in the
administration of the trust estate as well as the traditional policy of courts of
equity of maintaining their jurisdiction as an extraordinary one to be resorted
to only when the legal remedy is inadequate, would seem to favor the New
York rule that the legal remedy against the trustee must be exhausted before
coming into equity to reach equitable assets." Stone, zz Col. L. Rev. 527,
530. The above argument would not seem to be applicable in those states
in which law and equity have been most completely fused in one court and
one single action in which all parties interested may be joined, all rights
determined and both equitable and legal relief given as appropriate in the
same decree.
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chancery to have his claim satisfied directly out of the trust
property. This was allowed.'
The last few paragraphs have undertaken the exposition
of the following three points well established by authority:
i. A trustee who has paid a judgment for a "TRUST-TORT"
is entitled to reimbursement.
2. A trustee against whom such a judgment has been given
is entitled to exoneration from the trust assets.
3. A third party having such a judgment against a trustee
may be subrogated to the trustee's right of indemnity.
It now becomes necessary to qualify these statements in
accordance with what also seems to be the weight of authority.
The right of the trustee in equity to have the expense of
satisfying such a judgment comes ultimately from the trust
property, whether by reimbursement or exoneration, is depend-
ent upon the state of his accounts as stated by Prof. Scott:8
"If the trustee is in default to the estate, his claim to exonera-
tion like his claim to reimbursement is reduced by the amount
that he is indebted to the estate and the creditor's right against
the estate is reduced accordingly; and if the amount of the
trustee's indebtedness exceeds the amount of the creditor's
claim, the creditor cannot hold the trust estate at all." This
statement is of course equally applicable whether the creditor
is a contract creditor or one who has a tort judgment.
Secondly: The right of a trustee to reimbursement or exon-
eration is said in many cases to be confined to cases where he is
without personal fault. The meaning of expressions of this
sort is dear enough in cases where the tort was committed by a
servant whom it was proper for the trustee to employ and where
proper care was used in selecting the employee. It is also clear
enough when the tort was an intentional act of the trustee and
resulted in no benefit to the trust estate. However there may
17 In re Raybould (i 90) I Ch. x99. For collections of cases on exonera-
tion and reimbursement see footnotes in treatises and articles as cited notes i,
z, and 3 supra. See also sec. z68 Restatement, Trusts.
is z8 Harv. L. Rev. 7M5, za Col. L. Rev. 527, 528 footnote z.
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be cases of fraud and deceit committed by a trustee actuated by
over-zeal or a tough conscience in which instance the estate
certainly should not be permitted to benefit by the act of him
whom the writer again thinks of functionally as its agent.
While this reasoning is not adopted there is authority for the
result.1"
Probably the majority of all the "TRUST-TORT" cases are
those where injury to person or property has resulted from
the trustee's failure to keep the property in repair. It has been
chiefly in cases of this sort that the rule has been laid down that
trustees must be sued in the personal and not in their represen-
tative capacity for "TRUST-TORTS." There are more of these
cases in New York than in any other jurisdiction. The pre-
vailing rule was early recognized and has been repeatedly
followed there. It seems somewhat significant that so many of
these New York cases have been those in which the tort claim
arose out of defective conditions of premises, which must in the
nature of things be a matter for which the trustee will ordinarily
be personally responsible.2" However, nothing seems to have
been made of this circumstance in connection with the primary
problem of the form in which suit must be brought. It has of
course received attention in considering the right of the trustee
to indemnity. Mr. Bogert suggests in this connection: "It is
believed that equity should also allow the trustee reimburse-
ment in the case of unintentional torts committed by the trus-
tee, where there is personal fault on the part of the trustee,
but the tort is a usual concomitant of the conduct of a busi-
ness such as that which the trustee is carrying on for the
trust."'" It will be noted that in the above statement Mr. Bo-
'9 Footnotes, 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, chap. 34, 44 A.L.R. 637-
" A few of these New York Cases are Keating v. Stevenson, 47 N.Y.S.
847, 2 App. Div. 604 (897); Moniot v. Jackson, 81 N.Y.S. 688, 40 Misc.
197 (1903); Norling v. Allee, 13 N.Y.S. 791 (1891), and in other states,
Shepard v. Creamer, I6o Mass. 496, 36 N.E. 475 (1894); Baker v. Tib-
bets, 16z Mass. 468, 39 N.E. 350 (1895); Everett v. Foley, 132 Ill. App.
438 (1907).
21 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, p. 2175.
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gert is really talking about "the trust" as if it were an entity
although he favors the orthodox rule which requires the tort
claimant to sue the trustee in his individual capacity.22
The meaning of what seems to be the law in most jurisdic-
tions for the tort claimant seems to be approximately as follows:
i. He may sue the trustee personally.
2. If he gets judgment, he may satisfy it out of the per-
sonal property of the trustee by ordinary legal process
such as execution.
3. If judgment is not satisfied by the trustee, either with or
without resort to execution, he may come into equity by
means of a creditor's bill and seek to reach the trust res.
4. The right of the tort creditor to reach the trust res in
equity is dependent upon a right in the trustee to be re-
imbursed or exonerated, which in turn is dependent upon
two prerequisites: (a) That the trustee is not in arrears
in his trust account: (b) That the tort was not a personal
wrong of the trustee.
5. If the trustee is execution proof and without right to ex-
oneration the tort claimant is without substantial remedy.
This seems particularly unfair to the claimant where the
tort was committed by a servant and right to reach the trust res
is denied because the trustee is in arrears. On the other hand it
might seem unfair to some that the cestui should first have been
robbed by his trustee and then have his property still further
depleted to pay such a claim. Which point of view will appeal
to the reader must of course depend on his fundamental value
judgments. Which policy should prevail? Shall the law zeal-
ously guard trust property against encroachments or is it more
important that injuries to third parties which arise out of the
operation of trusts should be compensated? This suggests that
it might be pertinent to consider the nature of the trust and
of the property so held. Is it a trust to operate a business or
to operate extensive rental property in which the trustee or his
22 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, p. z169.
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agents retain control of the common parts of the premises, as
in an office building or apartment house, or is it on the other
hand merely a passive trust or an instance of leasing premises
and cbllecting rents with the tenants in entire control? 3
REPRESENTATIVE LIABILITY
There are a few cases, mostly recent, which allow a tort
claimant to sue the trustee in his representative capacity and if
judgment is rendered for him the claimant may satisfy it direct-
ly out of the trust res. There are so few of these cases that it is
difficult to be certain just what is the scope of this right. Clearly
it would be applicable where the tort was committed by an
employee and did not involve any personal fault on the part
of the trustee. In the case of Ewing v. Foley,24 the Texas Su-
preme Court stated the question as follows: "Is the trust estate
liable in damages for the negligence of the agent of the trustees?
May the injured party proceed directly against the property of
the trust estate in a suit against the trustees in their representa-
tive capacity?" After an extended discussion of the liability of
trustees and of their right to indemnity in which the court
dealt at some length with Benett v. Wyndham and In re Ray-
bould it concluded: "The holding that a trustee in cases where
he is not chargeable with personal fault or negligence, may
legally be reimbursed out of the trust estate for such damages
as may be recovered against him, is in effect a holding that in
such cases the trust estate is itself liable for such damages, and
since the trust estate is so liable we think our practice allows it
to be proceeded against in a suit brought directly against the,
trustee in his representative capacity."
23 That the nature of these duties may be the basis for making an excep-
tion and that he may then be sued in his official capacity see infra. "It seems
probable that the rule denying liability on the part of the estate for torts of
executor, administrator, or trustee originated in cases of passive trusts where
the only purpose of the executors etc., was in collecting and distributing the
assets, and that the courts have not sufficiently considered the rule which should
be applied when the business was being actively conducted for the estate."
Annot. 44 A.L.R. 637, 639.
24 115 Tex. 222, 280 S.W. 499, 44 A.L.R. 627 (1926).
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An even more recent case from Florida, Smith v. Coleman,2
apparently allows direct action against the trust estate for a tort
which may be said to involve a degree of personal fault on the
part of the trustee in failing to see that the equipment on the
trust premises was adequately safeguarded. The plaintiff in
this case, a minor, was employed in a laundry which was being
operated by a trustee with an active manager as the trustee's
agent in charge. The plaintiff was injured by an unguarded
machine of which the manager had failed to warn him. Action
was brought against Smith as trustee. There was a verdict for
the plaintiff and the judgment was against Smith as trustee and
it was expressly provided in the judgment that it should be
paid out of the assets of the trust estate. After a long discussion
of points not pertinent to the present problem the court disposes
of the trusts question in a few words: "This was correct, while
the general rule is that the trust estate is not liable for the torts
of the trustee, as the law will not allow the trust estate to be
impaired by the negligence or improvidence of the trustee, this
rule is subject to exceptions. Thus, where an active trust is
created and the trustee is charged with the duty of carrying on
a business, the trust estate may be liable for the negligence of
the trustee or his employees, unless there be some limitation to
the contrary imposed by statute or by the instrument creating
the trust."
This case would seem to take a bolder stand than the few
other allowing direct action against the estate in that the opinion
makes no distinction as to whether the tort is committed by an
employee or is the personal act or omission of the trustee him-
self. On the other hand it makes more of the point that this
rule is to be confined to cases of an active trust to carry on a
business.
Another case allowing recovery against the trustee in his
representative capacity and directly out of the trust property is
25 IOO Fla. 1707, 13Z So. 198 (1931), noted 29 Mich. L. Rev. IIO2.
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Wright v. Caney River Railway Co.26 In this case an employee
was killed when a trestle gave way because the rain had washed
away some of the earth supporting its foundation and this con-
dition had been allowed by the trustee to remain unrepaired.
This was a case of a trustee for creditors which brings it very
dose functionally at least if not formally to the cases which have
arisen against railroad receivers and which have always been
distinguished from the type of trust cases heretofore discussed
in this paper.
There have of course been innumerable tort actions against
receivers not only of railroads but of other businesses in which
the receivers were sued in their official capacity and the judg-
ments rendered against the property embarked in the business.
The distinctions relied upon as between receiverships and pri-
vate trusts is that a receiver is not the holder of legal title to the
property but is an officer of the court and a representative of
the debtor-owner who is still the holder of the legal tide in his
or its own capacity as a legal person. The answer to this reason-
ing then would seem to be that the action should be brought
against the debtor.
In spite of the reason usually given for the distinction be-
tween trustees and receivers as to suing the trustee as an indi-
vidual and the receiver as an officer, the trustee of a railroad
operating the road for mortgage bondholders or other creditors
will be held liable in his official capacity. This rule has been
applied to various kinds of torts as may be noted from the cases
cited in the sources referred to in the footnote."
26 1 P N.C. 529, 66 S.E. 588, i9 Ann. Cas. 384 (19o9), also see Miller
v. Smythe, 22 Ga. 154, 18 S.E. 46 (1893) and comment 3 Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees, p. 2168.
27 In the absence of personal negligence a receiver is not individually liable
for the negligence of servants, but may be sued only in his official capacity,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 11z, 1124.
"The cases holding receivers liable in their official capacity for their torts
and permitting collection from receivership funds is not at variance with the
trust cases, because a receivership is in the ordinary sense distinguishable from
a trust. It involves no 'Title' in the receiver . . . " 3 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees, p. ?164, footnote 37.
I Clark on Receivers, p. 543; Meara v. Holbrook, 20 O.S. 137 (1870),
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The difficulty in the way of treating a trust as an entity is,
as indicated in the last previous paragraphs, not insuperable.
In a receivership or a trust for the operation of a railroad, and
in a few other cases, it is recognized that a tort judgment is an
expense incident to the operation of the property. It is therefore
prior to the claims of creditors whose claims antedated the re-
ceivership or trusteeship, and who, as creditors, are in effect
the cestuis que trust in such a relationship."5 Indeed, in the case
of Wright v. Caney River Railway Co."9 one of the points which
was emphasized by the court as a reason for making the tort
action a direct claim against the property was that the property
was being operated for the creditors as beneficiaries. There
seems no good reason why this reasoning is not just as appropos
in considering other trusts where property is being operated by
a trustee for the benefit of cestuis que trust as the reasoning
employed in the cases following the majority view, which put
all their emphasis on the state of the legal title shutting their
eyes to the functions which are going on before them.
Numerous commentators have urged the practical value of
this minority view, and Mr. Bogert in his treatise,"0 although
io A.L.R. 1057 Annot.; Blumenthal v. Brahverd, 38 Vt. 402 (1866) (earliest
American case). In England no separate action is allowed but the person
injured files his claim in the receivership proceeding according to 1 Clark on
Receivers, p. 518.
28Brownz v. Tinterbottom, 98 O.S. 127, 12o N.E. 292, 3 A.L.R. 1465
(1918) Annot. See also note 47 Harvard L. Rev. 359 on an Indiana case
where tort claim which had not been reduced to judgment was permitted to
be proved in the receivership and given priority over mortgage. This is an
extension of the usual rule in this country which allows priority to expenses
but does so class tort claims until they have been merged in judgment.
McCullough, v. Union Traction Co., 206 Ind. 585, 186 N.E. 300 (1933).
2 Note 26 supra.
30 Section 270 Restatement, Trusts, "Persons to whom the trustee has
incurred a liability in the administration of the trust can by a proceeding in
equity reach trust property and apply it to the satisfaction of their claims, if
by the terms of the trust the settlor manifested an intention to confer such
a power upon them." It appears that the draftsman of the Restatement does
not go as far as much of the case authority in this situation as to allowing a
representative suit. This would substantially follow the suggestion of Mr.
Justice Stone's article in such cases as this. It would serve to protect the
claimant in case of an execution proof trustee. But logically of course, one
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he adheres to the general theory that the right of the tort cred-
itor must be a derivative thing and that actions should be
against the trustee as a person, nevertheless recognized that
there is a modern trend toward official liability.
Where the trust instrument provides that all obligations
arising in the administration of the trust shall be paid from the
trust assets, it is generally held that an action may be main-
tained against the trustee as such. It is not easy to see why,
from a precedural standpoint, such a provision should make any
difference. If a trust is not a matter of legal entity surely the
settlor cannot make it one by a provision in his will or deed of
trust. Of course such a provision should be effective to settle
any doubt as to the right of the trustee to appropriate the trust
assets for the purposes of discharging trust obligations. But
this right, as we have seen, exists anyhow, except where the
tort was the personal fault of the trustee, or he was in arrears
in his accounts. Such a provision in the trust instrument was the
basis of decision in a Missouri case." This involved an injury
to a carrier boy in the plant of the Kansas City Star which was
being operated by the trustees under the will of its former
owner, Wm. Rockhill Nelson, which provided that all liabilities
incurred in the operation of the newspaper should be paid out
of the estate. Action having been brought against the trustees,
and one of them having died, it was contended that the action
being personal abated. The lower court sustained the demurrer
on this ground. This holding was reversed. This being a case
where the harm arose out of the negligence of the trustees in
not keeping the premises in proper repair the court relied for
its result on the provision in the will. It should be noted in
passing, however, that this was a trust to run a business and not
merely to hold and lease out property and collect the rent.
cannot recognize the claimant's right to a representative suit even at the
express authority of the settlor, without impliecdly recognizing the entity of
the trust. 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustee, p. z166, 44. A.L.R. 637, 678.31Birdsong v. Jones, z2z Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W. (2d) 98 (1928).
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There is also the case of Prinz v. Lucas32 where we find a
trust to continue a business and a provision in the deed of trust
that there should be no personal responsibility in the trustees
for negligence. The injury here was due to the negligence of a
driver employed in the business of the trust. The trustees were
sued in their official capacity and held liable as such.
Another situation, which has been made the basis of an ex-
ception to the rule of no liability upon trustees "Qua Trustee,"
is where the tort of the trustee has benefited the estate, but this
is also treated in the Restatement of Trusts3 on the same basis
as the situation last discussed, viz., as the basis of a right in
equity in the claimant and then only when no satisfaction can
be obtained from the trustee's individual property.
This general discussion of the tort liability of trust property
for trusts suggests the question as to how such disbursements
are to be allocated as between principal and income. This prob-
lem is the same when the money is finally taken out of the trust
assets whether by trustee reimbursing himself, by an equitable
execution under a creditors' bill or by allowing the representa-
tive suit and direct execution against the trust res.
It is of course well understood that the ordinary expenses
of trust administration are chargeable to income.34 Hence, the
burden is felt most acutely by a life tenant as against a remain-
derman cestui. However, there are extraordinary expenses
32 21o Pa. 620, 6o Ad. 309 (1905).
33 Sect. 269 Restatement, Trusts, "A person who has conferred a benefit
on the trust estate and cannot obtain satisfaction out of the trustee's individual
property can by a proceeding in equity reach trust property and apply it to
the satisfaction of his claim to the extent to which the trust estate has been
benefited, unless under the circumstances it would be inequitable to allow him
such remedy." However there are not a few authorities allowing the trustee
to be sued in his representative capacity and a direct resort to trust assets
where the estate has been benefitted. 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, p. 2169,
44 A.L.R. 637, 664.
" Again the reader is reminded that this paper does not aim at exhaustive
citation of case authorities but for the most part merely refers to secondary
sources wherein cases are collected. 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, chap. 38,
40 Ohio Jur. 408, title "Trusts," by Prof. Vanneman: "It is a general rule
that current expenses of an ordinary character must be paid out of the income."
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which are sometimes apportioned or even charged entirely to
the principal or corpus of the trust fund. 'there are many cases
dealing with the allocation of attorneys' fees as expenses of
trust when its validity has been under attack by disappointed
relatives of the settlor. It has been quite generally held that
such fees should be charged against the corpus of the trust."3
This is consistent with the rule which charges the expense of
permanent improvements upon the trust premises to principal
as contrasted with ordinary repairs which are to be paid for out
of income."
It would seem reasonable to regard the cost of paying a tort
claimant, who was injured by the negligence of a servant em-
ployed in the operation of the property as a current operating
expense and hence chargeable to income. Where an injury is
due to disrepair of the premises, if the payment is to come out
of the trust fund, as we have seen some considerable authority
allows, even where the condition is due to the personal fault or
neglect of the trustee, it will ordinarily be in a sense because
income was not used for making the repairs and so here too it
s "The regular annual or periodically recurring expenses arising in the
administration of a productive trust are paid out of the income while extra-
ordinary and unusual expenses are chargeable against the capital. The costs
of litigation generally fall in the latter class." Cogswell v. WestoV, z28 Mass.
z19, 117 N.E. 37 (1917). This case held that legal expenses of investigating
the trustees conduct and prosecution of an action on his bond were chargeable
to principal rather than income. That such expenses should be apportioned,
I re Meyers Estate, 161 N.Y.S. iiii (1916); charged to principal, In re
Wentwortk, 116 Misc. 26o, 19o N.Y.S. 364 (1921); In re Petremonts Will,
213 App. Div. 318, 210 N.Y.S. 379; aff. 241 N.Y. 586, 15o N.E. 566
(1925). Not to multiply cases it would seem to the writer that the later
tendency is to charge to the corpus the cost of preserving the estate as such
expense is incurred in connection with litigation.
86 40 Ohio Jur. 410: "An extraordinary expense, however, such as perma-
nent repairs or building shall be apportioned between life tenant and remain-
derman." The case cited for this was, however, one involving the erection of
a building on unproductive land. 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, p. 2326.
For distinction between repairs and improvements see p. 23z8: "If such cost
is placed upon the trust corpus there is at once an apportionment because of
the reduction of the life cestui's future income. To take his present income
also in part to meet the expenses of the improvement would put an undue
burden upon the life cestui."
3o8
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would hardly seem that, according to strict reasoning on the
basis of source, this item also should be a charge upon income.
Where a trust constitutes a nuisance or trust property is so
constructed as to cause harm to the person or property of
another, it may well be that the corpus of the trust should bear
the loss so caused to third parties." Harm of this sort is not so
much a result of operation as the ones previously mentioned.
In case the income account in a trust is not sufficient to meet
a judgment, once the claimant has by whatever theory and
process established his right to reach the trust propery, he is of
course not obliged to confine himself to income or to choose be-
tween the various assets except insofar as he is limited by
statutes.
If the corpus of a trust fund has been employed to satisfy a
tort claim which should be considered as an operational incident,
it should be proper to accumulate income from the trust capital
remaining thereafter until the corpus is made whole again.
In any case where a large sum is chargeable against a trust
fund for such purpose as the satisfaction of a tort claim, and
where such claim will leave the life tenant in a position of hard-
ship, or indeed in any such case, the courts should stand ready
as between trustee, life beneficiary, and remainderman, to see
that a fair and equitable scheme of allocation is adopted in view
of the probable dominant purpose of the settlor. This purpose
7 Ireland v. Bowman, I3O Ky. 153, 113 SAV. 56 (19o8) where trustees
were directed by will to maintain a dam, it was held that the third person
damaged thereby could maintain an action against the trustees in their repre-
sentative capacity and the judgment should be payable out of the trust prop-
erty. Nothing was said as to allocation of this expense as between income and
principal. In sec. iz, Uniform Principal and Income Law are a set of rules
conforming to general current practice but nothing therein expressly refers
to judgments in tort actions.
Mr. Bogert makes this statement: "The costs of litigation incurred by the
trustee in seeking to enforce the trust or in defending it are generally placed
upon the capital of the trust fund. Such items include attorney's fee, court
costs and disbursements." 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, p. a335. By the
word "disbursements" Mr. Bogert may mean the payment of judgments;
however none of the main cases which he cites in his footnote have to do with
this particular type of obligation.
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may well be that the present life beneficiary's income be main-
tained rather than the corpus be preserved for a remainderman
who is to take in the remote future. The disposition of courts
to do things like this is more marked in some recent cases than
a strict reading of ancient precedents would indicate.
Notwithstanding the frequent statements that courts regard
it as the normal intent of those who create trusts, that the life
tenants shall have deducted from the income whatever is neces-
sary to preserve the capital intact, a realistic interpretation of
modern trusts with a genuine interest to learn the real intent of
the settlor will probably indicate that the average man who
"trustees" his family is chiefly interested that his widow and
children shall be comfortably supported and only secondarily
that his more remote descendants shall come into his fortune.
The orthodox presumption is a direct consequence of thinking
the thoughts of the feudal lawyers who worked out the basic
rules of the law of trusts and future interests.
